The reason for that is simple. Grotesquely excessive partisanship. This has its roots in the fact that the two major political parties nominate candidates for the supreme court seats.
Thirty years ago, that didn’t matter very much, except that the supreme court was often used by both parties as a dumping ground or a rest home for politicians whose careers were on the wane.
We had a fair number of justices who had been governors and senators but who had little or no previous experience on the bench.
Today, however, the situation is far worse. Divisions between the parties have become far more sharply ideological, and the political parties have been spending millions to try and defend, capture, or recapture high court seats. That’s a development nobody saw coming when the current state constitution was adopted in 1963.
A nasty politically charged atmosphere has crackled through court decisions over the last few years, as case after case was decided on narrowly partisan lines. But that’s now started to change.
Last year, the Democrats unexpectedly gained a seat, and another Republican justice, Elizabeth Weaver, began voting more like an independent. These developments enabled the Michigan Supreme Court last week to formally adopt a change that should give Michiganders much more confidence in the system’s integrity.
Chief Justice Marilyn Kelly proposed the justices adopt a new rule designed to avoid conflicts of interest. Judges are always supposed to announce that they won’t take part in any case in which they may have any conflict of interest. That’s always been the case.
Most judges I’ve known have been very good about avoiding such conflicts. But until now, there has been no way to stop a judge who chooses to ignore a conflict, short of trying to impeach him or her after the fact. The worst example of this I know came in West Virginia. There, the chief justice of that state, one Brent Benjamin, refused to recuse himself from a case two years ago, even though the defendant, the A.T. Massey Coal Company, had spent three million dollars to get him elected to the bench.
Last June, the U.S. Supreme Court said Benjamin’s refusal to remove himself was clearly wrong and unconstitutional.
That led to the Michigan Supreme Court’s current decision that in the future, if justices with apparent conflicts in any cases refuse to remove themselves, the other judges will decide whether to let them take part in the case or not. The vote was close, four to three.
Three hardline conservatives insisted it was improper to let anyone else decide whether an individual they had a conflict or not.
But they were outvoted, a result which the majority felt was a victory for fairness. With this, Chief Justice Kelly said, the court now has a way to remove a judge who “is unable to render an unbiased decision and is unable or unwilling to acknowledge that fact.”
And, she added, “the justice system and this court can only be stronger for it.” It is hard for me to see how anyone could disagree.
The West Virginia case to which Mr. Lessenberry referred was decided by a 5-4 vote in the United States Supreme Court. I commend to anyone who is interested, that decision, and most particularly the dissenting opinions. The full name of the case is Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, et al.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-22.ZS.html
What we should note is that the judge in Caperton was not accused of any direct conflict; there was no quid pro quo alleged, and none was shown. The Coal Co. (what a perfect villain in popular culture; a coal mining company) didn't make any donations; its Chairman didn't make any "donations" to the Judge's election campaign. (Actually, that's not correct; the Chairman made a legal, reported, $1000 campaign contribution to the Judge's campaign.) What the Chairman did, was to form his own committee, and to use his own money to fund advertising of his own choosing to espouse a point of view favoring a particular candidate with whom he agreed. Some people like to call that "free speech." In New Jersey, they might call that "Jon Corzine spending $131 Million to get elected as governor." New Yorkers might call it, "Mayor Bloomberg." In Michigan, some might call it, "Geoffrey Fieger during election years." Consider that the West Virginia judge owned no stock in the Massey Coal Co. He would not gain or lose any money from any decision.
The main dissent in Caperton, written by Chief Justice Roberts, is a model of practical thinking. The dissent included 40 terrific questions as to how such a rule might be subject to mystical interpretation:
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1. How much money is too much money? What level of contribution or expenditure gives rise to a “probability of bias”?
2. How do we determine whether a given expenditure is “disproportionate”? Disproportionate to what?
3. Are independent, non-coordinated expenditures treated the same as direct contributions to a candidate’s campaign? What about contributions to independent outside groups supporting a candidate?
4. Does it matter whether the litigant has contributed to other candidates or made large expenditures in connection with other elections?
5. Does the amount at issue in the case matter? What if this case were an employment dispute with only $10,000 at stake? What if the plaintiffs only sought non-monetary relief such as an injunction or declaratory judgment?
6. Does the analysis change depending on whether the judge whose disqualification is sought sits on a trial court, appeals court, or state supreme court?
7. How long does the probability of bias last? Does the probability of bias diminish over time as the election recedes? Does it matter whether the judge plans to run for reelection?
8. What if the “disproportionately” large expenditure is made by an industry association, trade union, physicians’ group, or the plaintiffs’ bar? Must the judge recuse in all cases that affect the association’s interests? Must the judge recuse in all cases in which a party or lawyer is a member of that group? Does it matter how much the litigant contributed to the association?
9. What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a financial one? Must a judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion rights if he has received “disproportionate” support from individuals who feel strongly about either side of that issue? If the supporter wants to help elect judges who are “tough on crime,” must the judge recuse in all criminal cases?
10. What if the candidate draws “disproportionate” support from a particular racial, religious, ethnic, or other group, and the case involves an issue of particular importance to that group?
11. What if the supporter is not a party to the pending or imminent case, but his interests will be affected by the decision? Does the Court’s analysis apply if the supporter “chooses the judge” not in his case, but in someone else’s?
12. What if the case implicates a regulatory issue that is of great importance to the party making the expenditures, even though he has no direct financial interest in the outcome (e.g., a facial challenge to an agency rulemaking or a suit seeking to limit an agency’s jurisdiction)?
13. Must the judge’s vote be outcome determinative in order for his non-recusal to constitute a due process violation?
14. Does the due process analysis consider the underlying merits of the suit? Does it matter whether the decision is clearly right (or wrong) as a matter of state law?
15. What if a lower court decision in favor of the supporter is affirmed on the merits on appeal, by a panel with no “debt of gratitude” to the supporter? Does that “moot” the due process claim?
16. What if the judge voted against the supporter in many other cases?
17. What if the judge disagrees with the supporter’s message or tactics? What if the judge expressly disclaims the support of this person?
18. Should we assume that elected judges feel a “debt of hostility” towards major opponents of their candidacies? Must the judge recuse in cases involving individuals or groups who spent large amounts of money trying unsuccessfully to defeat him?
19. If there is independent review of a judge’s recusal decision, e.g., by a panel of other judges, does this completely foreclose a due process claim?
20. Does a debt of gratitude for endorsements by newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or celebrities also give rise to a constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias? How would we measure whether such support is disproportionate?
21. Does close personal friendship between a judge and a party or lawyer now give rise to a probability of bias?
22. Does it matter whether the campaign expenditures come from a party or the party’s attorney? If from a lawyer, must the judge recuse in every case involving that attorney?
23. Does what is unconstitutional vary from State to State? What if particular States have a history of expensive judicial elections?
24. Under the majority’s “objective” test, do we analyze the due process issue through the lens of a reasonable person, a reasonable lawyer, or a reasonable judge?
25. What role does causation play in this analysis? The Court sends conflicting signals on this point. The majority asserts that “[w]hether Blankenship’s campaign contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin’s victory is not the proper inquiry.” Ante, at 15. But elsewhere in the opinion, the majority considers “the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election,” ante, at 14, and whether the litigant has been able to “choos[e] the judge in his own cause,” ante, at 16. If causation is a pertinent factor, how do we know whether the contribution or expenditure had any effect on the outcome of the election? What if the judge won in a landslide? What if the judge won primarily because of his opponent’s missteps?
26. Is the due process analysis less probing for incumbent judges—who typically have a great advantage in elections—than for challengers?
27. How final must the pending case be with respect to the contributor’s interest? What if, for example, the only issue on appeal is whether the court should certify a class of plaintiffs? Is recusal required just as if the issue in the pending case were ultimate liability?
28. Which cases are implicated by this doctrine? Must the case be pending at the time of the election? Reasonably likely to be brought? What about an important but unanticipated case filed shortly after the election?
29. When do we impute a probability of bias from one party to another? Does a contribution from a corporation get imputed to its executives, and vice-versa? Does a contribution or expenditure by one family member get imputed to other family members?
30. What if the election is nonpartisan? What if the election is just a yes-or-no vote about whether to retain an incumbent?
31. What type of support is disqualifying? What if the supporter’s expenditures are used to fund voter registration or get-out-the-vote efforts rather than television advertisements?
32. Are contributions or expenditures in connection with a primary aggregated with those in the general election? What if the contributor supported a different candidate in the primary? Does that dilute the debt of gratitude?
33. What procedures must be followed to challenge a state judge’s failure to recuse? May Caperton claims only be raised on direct review? Or may such claims also be brought in federal district court under 42 U. S. C. §1983, which allows a person deprived of a federal right by a state official to sue for damages? If §1983 claims are available, who are the proper defendants? The judge? The whole court? The clerk of court?
34. What about state-court cases that are already closed? Can the losing parties in those cases now seek collateral relief in federal district court under §1983? What statutes of limitation should be applied to such suits?
35. What is the proper remedy? After a successful Caperton motion, must the parties start from scratch before the lower courts? Is any part of the lower court judgment retained?
36. Does a litigant waive his due process claim if he waits until after decision to raise it? Or would the claim only be ripe after decision, when the judge’s actions or vote suggest a probability of bias?
37. Are the parties entitled to discovery with respect to the judge’s recusal decision?
38. If a judge erroneously fails to recuse, do we apply harmless-error review?
39. Does the judge get to respond to the allegation that he is probably biased, or is his reputation solely in the hands of the parties to the case?
40. What if the parties settle a Caperton claim as part of a broader settlement of the case? Does that leave the judge with no way to salvage his reputation?
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As you can see, "Caperton" is a mess, that will invite a bigger mess in the future.
Now, back to Michigan. The Michigan State Democratic Party spent a lot of money to get former Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Diane Marie Hathaway elevated to the Supreme Court. The Democrats funded and produced a scurrilous advertisement, in which they featured an accusation that Michigan Chief Justice Clfford Taylor was asleep on the bench during oral arguments -- the infamous "Sleeping Judge" ad, which was shown to be false, at least according to attorneys in the court room at the time. (A careful review of the court's videotapes never showed that Chief Justice Taylor was ever asleep, but the phony ad put the Republican Justice in the position of having to prove a negative; the courtroom recording system does not show every Justice, all the time. So, thanks to some Democratic donors (including, no doubt, many of the personal injury lawyers who made the removal of Justice Taylor their main electoral goal). So, under the Caperton rule, should Justice Diane Hathaway be removed from all cases in which Democrats are involved? How about attorneys who are known to have supported the "Sleeping Judge" campaign? Is that not like the West Virginia case, with perhaps the dollar amounts changed?
Posted by: Anonymous | December 02, 2009 at 11:36 PM